《分權、合謀與礦難》

 

賈瑞雪（UCSD） 聶輝華（人民大學）

 

摘要：這篇文章考察了規制者與企業之間的政企合謀如何影響了中國煤礦企業的生產安全。我們認為，分權導致政企合謀更加容易，并且當合謀的交易費用更低時這種效應更加明顯。通過分析分權與規制者的個人特征，本文檢驗了上述假說。利用煤礦領域的分權和集權改革，我們發現：分權帶來了更高的礦難死亡率。進一步，死亡率的增加對那些有更低交易費用（用籍貫度量）的規制者來說更明顯。

 

Decentralization, Collusion and Coalmine Deaths

 

Ruixue Jia and Huihua Nie

 

Abstract—This paper investigates how collusion between regulators and firms affects workplace safety using the case of China’s coal mine deaths. We argue that decentralization makes collusion more likely and that its effect is strengthened if the transaction costs of collusion are lower. These hypotheses are tested by investigating the impact of decentralization con- tingent on regulators’ characteristics. Exploring both decentralization and centralization reforms in the coal mine industry, we find that decentraliza- tion is correlated with an increase in coal mine death rates. Moreover, this increase in mortality is larger for the regulators with lower transaction costs (proxied by the locality of origin).

本文于2015年7月被世界頂級期刊REStat接受發表，2017年2月正式刊印，引用出處：Jia, Ruixue, Huihua Nie, 2017, “Decentralization, Collusion and Coalmine Deaths",  Review of Economics and Statistics,99(1): 105–118.
 

官方下載鏈接：http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/REST_a_00563，相關數據和程序下載地址：https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/210SQS。

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